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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE 
OF: 
KENNETH DALE ASHTON 
Case No. 940696-CA 
Priority Classification 15 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT, RUTH ELIZABETH ASHTON 
ARGUMENT 
I. MRS. ASHTON IS NOT CHALLENGING THE ACCURACY AND VERACITY OF 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT. RATHER, MRS. ASHTON 
MAINTAINS THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ACCURATELY 
REFLECTS ALL OF AND THE ONLY EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL. 
The Appellant (hereinafter "Mrs. Ashton") did not file a 
trial transcript when she brought this appeal because the only 
evidence presented at trial is accurately portrayed by Judge 
Lewis' Memorandum Decision and the Trial Court's Findings of 
Fact. In their brief, Respondents (hereinafter "Heirs") claim 
Mrs. Ashton is asking this court to retry the facts of this case. 
Respondent's Brief, Point V p.10, 31. Quite to the contrary, 
Appellant clearly states in her brief that "Mrs. Ashton does not 
question the veracity of the Trial Court's factual findings. . ." 
Appellant's Brief, p. 19. 
As advanced by Appellant's Brief, Mrs. Ashton maintains that 
the Trial Court's factual findings do not rise to the level of 
clear and convincing evidence of Mr, Ashton's (hereinafter 
" li various times title was placed 
in the Decedent's and Mrs. Ashton's names as joint tenants with 
full rights of survivorship OR as Tenants in Common. Simply put, 
t h fc j %., i i titSi) 1111' -i |i M »i*Jer«»",e u , ' i n t l i i i iu^ p r e s r ; i i " P , I * r ; he 
Trial Court which established Decedent did not intend to create 
valid title when title was executed; that Decedent did not intend 
tmi) pans a present. porn^uM1! r i ,i" i iit.i-M.eol li li the-1 v*vr \.n\iu proper:I:, i e s 
at the time title was established in Decedent's and Mrs. Ashton's 
names. , Ashton is not asking this Court to retry the facts 
c 
Since *" evidence presented ^ and relied upon by the Trial 
Court does * -* v * - m d convincing evidence 
c .. t: I: i, e u ai: :i on s j o i i 11 
ownership interests were formed, the Trial Court erred, as a 
matter of ] aw, :i n ruling that ALL property titled :I n Decedent's 
and • Ash, I: ::>i i s names,, jninl ly - ''"i1' '" l»<* i nc 1 iideifl in the 
Decedent's estate. This Is especially true when the Trial Court 
did .*v>+ even bother to take evidence - * which properties were 
brougi i ii i, m o n M I I \.\ iiiy i-i 
Decedent*- ame added to the record title of Mrs. Ashton's 
property. 
II# AS OPPOSED TO THE ASSERTIONS MADE IN RESPONDENT'S BRIEF, THE 
CURRENT FINDINGS OF FACT DO NOT AND CANNOT, AS A MATTER OF 
LAW, RISE TO THE LEVEL OF CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT 
DECEDENT DID NOT INTEND TO GIVE MRS. ASHTON VALID AND 
PRESENT JOINT OWNERSHIP INTERESTS IN HIS PROPERTY. 
The evidence relied upon he Ti;i a] Court j n coming 
2 
ruling that Decedent did not intend to give a present ownership 
interest in the various properties titled in Decedent's and Mrs. 
Ashton's names does not rise to the level of clear and convincing 
evidence* Evidence rises to the level of "clear and convincing 
evidence" when it leads to the conclusion that the truth of the 
matter asserted is highly probable.1 
Mrs. Ashton asserts that the evidence presented at trial, 
accurately depicted in the Trial Court's Findings of Fact and 
addressed by Judge Lewis in her Memorandum Decisionf does not and 
cannot, as a matter of law, lead to the conclusion that it is 
"highly probable" Decedent did not intend to create the specific 
interests identified by title to the various jointly held 
properties.2 Even a cursory examination of the very facts 
relied upon by the Trial Court supports Mrs. Ashton's contention. 
Inasmuch as Respondent's Brief has misrepresented Mrs. Ashton's 
position with regard to what evidence the Trial Court relied upon 
in coming to its decision, a review of Mrs. Ashton's actual 
position regarding the Trial Court's factual findings is proper 
xE.g. Riley Hill Gen. Contr. v. Tandy Corp. 737 P.2d 595, 602 
(Or. 1987)("To be clear and convincing, evidence must establish 
that the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable."); Davis 
v. Dept of Labor & Industries, 615 P.2d 1279, 1283 (Wash 1980) 
(Clear and convincing standard of proof denotes quantum of proof 
less than "beyond a reasonable doubt" but greater than a 
"preponderance of the evidence.") 
2It is questionable whether the evidence relied upon by the 
Trial Court even meets the preponderance of the evidence test. 
Proof by "preponderance of the evidence" means that the fact finder 
must believe that the facts asserted are more probably true than 
false. E.g. Riley Hill Gen. Contr. v. Tandy Corp., 737 P.2d 595, 
602 (Or. 1987). 
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at this time. 
1 
Respondent's Brief at pages J J - ^ * ^shton actually 
stated ^ K*=**" K* *>4 - - ^ix t^-fltpmp *s quoted on oa ^ e 19 
of App*-* r 
Because there * -^uarate iaciudi tindmqp n • oe Trial 
Court's Findi'v * ~ • *- *»>*. A,»--. accurate - i 
approprif * s 
broad categories. 
When examininq luriqe Lewi a" Memorandum Decision and the 
a c t u a l l a n g u a g e i I I I in III i ill i nil I i I i nil i in | ill I ,n I ill In 
a b u n d a n t l y c l e a r t h a t a i l t h e t a c t u a l Iim1im|fci r e l a t e t o w h a t 
D e c e d e n t ' n 1 l i t e n t i n n " w e r e a t o r i r o u n d t h e t i m e he e x e c u t e d h i s 
w i l l ; Mill i i I in ill Hi Jli nl ,i in in I Mill ill i i ill I IK M ILLIMJ in I mite1 I ill lie 
was 1 aken in his and Mis, Ashton's names. 
For instance, Faraqrapln S 11 nf the Findinqs ot F.inrt 
expresnly i elate to concerns the Don i ilent and Mib. A-ahLon had it 
the time they wnie developing their identical wills. As stated 
by Paragraph I Lit discussing their wills, the Decedent and 
[Mrs. Ashton | WCM u concerned about fair disiLixUiuiLxuJi ji Lliuir 
combined total • »tate to theii respective children," (Emphasis 
added) • A i f ho t exf r 1 ear 1 y i ni 11 < ii I I he* i ntent i ons beinq 
discussed lelatua Lu jhal UucudeuL"^ inLuuL i idu at ui jiuum I 
time he executed his will, Inch is true tor each of Paragraphs 5 
through 8. 
Again,. *« ^ragraphs y 14 ul the Trial , C o u r t ' s F indings of 
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Fact, the only intent addressed relates to worksheets prepared 
and relied upon by Decedent when determining what percentage of 
his and Mrs* Ashton's property would be devised to their 
respective children pursuant to their wills. At the time 
Decedent was developing his will, Decedent may very well have 
desired to divide jointly held property pursuant to the 
percentages calculated on the worksheets. However, what 
Decedent's intent was at the time he developed his will is only 
minimally relevant, at best, in attempting to defeat Mrs. 
Ashton's survivorship rights in the various jointly held 
properties. 
Likewise, Paragraphs 15-32 of the Trial Court's Findings of 
Fact relate to the actual preparation and execution of Decedent's 
and Mrs. Ashton's identical wills. Again, the only references to 
or discussions of "intent" found in Paragraphs 15-32 are those 
addressing what concerns were raised in order to have their 
respective wills generated by Carolyn Driscoll, the attorney who 
originally drafted the parties' wills, as well as the subsequent 
addendum. Nowhere in Paragraphs 15-32 can one find indications, 
let alone clear and convincing evidence supporting a factual 
finding, that Decedent did not "intend" to give a present 
possessory interest to Mrs. Ashton in his properties at the time 
title to property was taken and recorded in both of their names. 
What Decedent's intent was at the time he developed and executed 
his will, standing alone, is totally irrelevant to Mrs. Ashton's 
survivorship rights in jointly held property. 
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M o r e o v e r I u a g r a p h s 1 5 - 3 2 a r e i l l u s t r a t i v e of a t l e a s t o n e 
r e a s o n why i l a y i L I | U H L - LIIU'JL wlim a n . i MI >Rj IIII( I I i . l i a l a 
s u r v i v o r s h i p i n t e r e s t t o p r o v e Liy i l e a r and c o n v i n c i n g e v i d e n c e 
t h a t a t _ t h e t i m e f he • j o i n t t p n a n r y wan f f p a l p r i t IMP g r a n t o r d i d 
n o t i n t e n d UJ I t e a t t i MI I 11 1  | m i Il II i 11 mi i y . ' IIIHSI* paxagxaphs 
document several i it'i. tons, during the r e l a t i v e l y shor t time 
per iod surrounding the development mil execution ml Deredent 's 
wil I, when Dececli ml i IhiiKjecl Ino indentions concern iin| In : • i: i he 
wanted h i s property to be d is t r ibuto i l lieei e . g . . Findings of 
Fac t , Paraqraphs JM M, ni" NTH 1 .is Pair a graphs 33-14, 
Paraqi > i| il i i I I I I nl I lie Ti i Jill Couii a tac tual f indings 
r e l a t e to Decedent 's in tent concerning a change thai was made t o 
li i i vull I 11' i ill iicJdetiiliiii I hail «aii executed filler his o r iq ina l Willi 
had been executed. Fit Paragraphs JS-J/ anil I'l, I In Tr la I Court 
r e i t e r a t e s tha t a t the time Decedent executed h i s w i l l , he did 
i 2 in i I I  Il 111 i n h <* r 11 h i i i. h i 1111 * 11 1111 I 11 i n t IM u 1 H d I Il i <i 11 1 e 
the combined estate between his and Mrs. Ashton'a iaspect ive 
child i •-•! ,. Aqa i mi, conspicuously mi ssi nq is any reference to 
D e c e d e n t: 3 in ml n i l ill I  I in1 I i nn I ill I  i n i I a h ill i n \\ i i i l l 1 y h e l d 
property; the only lelevant factor to be considered wl in 
attempting to defeat Mrs. ftshfoil's survivorship interests. 
Paragraph III nl Ih I'l i II II I n i l II i n i l i iimi'ii m l l a c I o 
irrelevant to the Heirs illempt to defeat Mis, ftshton's 
3Brief of Appellant, Point XXI(B), p.16-18 provides a complete 
discussion of why the law requires those challenging a surviving 
joint tenant's right of survivorship to prove, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that at the time tile was taken as joi nt 
tenants, no valid joi nt tenancy was intended 
survivorship interest in the jointly held property* Regardless 
of Decedent's intent at the time these beneficiary designations 
were executed, they are simply immaterial to establishing what 
Decedent's intent was at the time property was taken in Decedent 
and Mrs. Ashton's names. 
When examined in light of ALL of the surrounding factual 
findings, Paragraphs 38 and 41 of the Trial Court's Findings of 
Fact exposes the legal errors that occurred in the Trial Court. 
Nowhere in the Trial Court's Findings of Fact are there 
paragraphs expressly relating to, or even remotely determining, 
what Decedent's intent was at the various times Decedent caused 
title to be taken in both his and Mrs. Ashton's names. Yet, 
without any reference to evidence regarding "intent" at the times 
title was taken in joint tenancy or as tenants in common, 
Paragraph 41 of the Trial Court's Findings of Fact leaps to the 
determination that the "total facts and circumstances further 
establish that the Decedent did not intend to give [Mrs. Ashton] 
a present interest or ownership in his property, that the joint 
tenancies and tenancies in common were created for convenience." 
The only evidence presented at trial was with regard to 
"intent" surrounding Decedent's development and execution of his 
will. It is obvious error, as a matter of law, to thereafter 
determine that this same evidence of "intent" is clear and 
convincing evidence of Decedent's "intent" at all other times, 
such as the times when Decedent caused title to be taken in both 
his and Mrs. Ashton's names. 
7 
Finally, Paragraph 38 of the Trial Court's Findings of Fact 
is a very good example of the dilemma facing the Trial Court, 
which lead to its erroneous ruling, as a matter of law. 
Paragraph 38 states " . . . the vast majority of the Decedent's 
property was transferred into joint tenancies or tenancies in 
common with [Mrs. Ashton]. The Decedent expressed a desire to 
preserve property for his children's benefit. This is 
inconsistent with giving TMrs. Ashton1 a present ownership 
interest." (Emphasis added). First, this finding shows Decedent 
understood property title consequences and therefore chose not to 
convert all of his property into jointly held property with Mrs. 
Ashton. Second, this factual finding establishes a concern that 
should have been explicitly resolved prior to defeating Mrs. 
Ashton's survivorship interest in the jointly held property. 
Paragraph 38 demonstrates that the Trial Court knew the mere 
act of transferring title on the various properties into his an 
Mrs. Ashton's names was evidence, though rebuttable, of 
Decedent's "intent" to convey a present interest in the property 
to Mrs. Ashton; otherwise, no inconsistency would exist. 
Pursuant to Utah law, the proper way to resolve this 
inconsistency is to require those challenging the validity of 
various titles to prove by clear and convincing evidence that, at 
the time the titles were created, the grantor did not intend to 
transfer a present ownership interest in the property. See Brief 
of Appellant, Point II, p. 10-13. In the present case, the Heirs 
failed to present any evidence, and the Trial Court failed to 
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find any evidence, concerning what the Decedent's intentions were 
at the various times he cause titled to be taken in his and Mrs. 
Ashton's names as joint tenants or as tenants in common. 
In effect, Respondents are arguing that the proper way to 
resolve the inconsistency is for the Trial Court to first 
determine what Decedent•s intent was at the time he executed his 
will. At that point, all that is left for the Trial Court to do 
is use that finding to supplant and supersede whatever Decedent's 
actual intent may have been at the various times he caused title 
to be taken in his and Mrs. Ashton's names.4 After a review of 
Judge Lewis' Memorandum Decision and the Trial Court's Findings 
of Fact, one can only conclude that the Trial Court accepted the 
Heirs' argument and ruled accordingly. 
Inasmuch as the facts of this case failed to address what 
Decedent's intent was at the various times title was taken in 
either joint tenancy or as tenants in common, the facts relied 
upon by the Trial Court do not and cannot, as a matter of law, 
lead to the conclusion that it is "highly probable" that Decedent 
did not intend to give Mrs. Ashton a present ownership interest 
in the properties. Therefore, the Trial Court's legal ruling 
that Decedent's estate should include all properties titled in 
4In effect, by adopting the procedures it did, the Trial Court 
is allowing Decedent and the Heirs to modify completed inter vivos 
transactions by will, which is contrary, not only to various 
express statements of the law, but also contrary to the legal 
principles and notions which support the doctrine of joint tenancy. 
For example: Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-104(5) (1993) states: A right of 
survivorship arising from the express terms of the account or under 
this section, a beneficiary designation in a trust account, or a 
P.O.D. payee designation, cannot be changed by will. 
9 
Decedent's and Mrs. Ashton's names, regardless of whether title 
was held as joint tenants with full rights to survivorship or as 
tenants in common, is improper. The Trial Court's ruling should 
be reversed because that ruling is not supported by any evidence, 
let alone clear and convincing evidence, of Decedent's intent at 
the time title was taken in Decedent's and Mrs Ashton's names. 
III. AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF DECEDENT'S ESTATE, MRS. ASHTON 
IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER LITIGATION COSTS, AS AN EXPENSE OF 
THE ESTATE, AND MRS. ASHTON'S COUNSEL IS ENTITLED TO 
REASONABLE COMPENSATION FOR SERVICES RENDER TO THE ESTATE. 
At the close of the new trial following remand, Mrs. Ashton 
moved to recover attorney compensation and litigation expenses, 
from the time of the Heirs' earlier appeal through to the 
present, as an expense of the estate. Judge Lewis summarily 
denied Mrs. Ashton's motion and ruled such expenses were 
individual expenses, not those of the estate. See, e.g.. Brief 
of Appellant, App., Judgment, Paragraph 4. 
The Heirs now assert that Mrs. Ashton did not preserve her 
right to appeal this issue because, at trial, Mrs. Ashton failed 
to present evidence as to the reasonableness of the compensation 
sought or any evidence showing that the expenses were incurred in 
good faith. Brief of Respondent, Point VI, p.34-38. It appears 
the Heirs mistakenly believe, or so they assert, that it is the 
duty of the personal representative to present evidence at the 
time of trial as to the reasonableness of the compensation sought 
and evidence that the conduct of the personal representative was 
commenced or carried out in good faith. Id. 
The law concerning any personal representatives' right to 
10 
recover attorney's compensation and litigation expenses is very 
clear in the State of Utah. Contrary to the Heirs' assertion, 
Mrs. Ashton did not present evidence regarding the reasonableness 
of compensation or litigation expenses because, as the language 
of Utah Code Ann. §75-3-718(1) indicates, Mrs. Ashton was under 
no obligation to do so. Pursuant to Section 75-3-718(1) of the 
Utah Probate Code, unless and until an interested person objects 
to the compensation requested, reasonable compensation shall be 
the amount requested. In the present case, no one, including the 
Trial Court, raised an objection to the reasonableness of the 
amount of compensation or litigation expenses requested because 
no amount was ever given inasmuch as the court Ordered accounting 
of Decedent's estate had not yet been completed by Mrs. Ashton, 
as personal representative. 
Furthermore, the Heirs failed to present any evidence at 
trial that Mrs. Ashton had acted in bad faith, and the Trial 
Court failed to make any findings regarding whether Mrs. Ashton 
was acting in good faith or not - the issue was simply not 
addressed at trial. At the close of the trial, the Trial Court 
simply denied Mrs. Ashton's request that attorney's compensation 
and litigation expenses be included in her accounting of the 
Decedent's estate, which the Trial Court ordered her to complete. 
As is apparent by reviewing the Trial Court's Findings of Fact, 
no evidence was ever even presented regarding either the 
reasonableness of compensation and expenses or as to whether or 
not the litigation expenses where incurred in good faith. 
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The language found in Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-718(1) and § 75-
3-719 speak in terms of mandatory reimbursement for reasonable 
attorney's fee's and litigation expenses incurred in good faith. 
Unless objected to by an interested party, the amount of 
compensation and litigation expenses requested is deemed to be 
reasonable and proper. Accordingly, had the Heirs or any other 
interested party objected to Mrs. Ashton's request at trial, the 
Trial Court would then have been in a proper position to make 
such a ruling.5 However, since no interested party objected to 
Mrs. Ashton's request for attorney compensation and reimbursement 
for litigation expenses, the Trial Court erred by summarily 
refusing to grant Mrs. Ashton's request. This Court should 
reverse the Trial Court's ruling on this issue and order that 
compensation and litigation expenses be included as an expense of 
the Decedent's estate and paid accordingly. 
CONCLUSION 
Mrs. Ashton does not question the veracity of the Trial 
Court's factual findings. In fact, Mrs. Ashton believes the 
Findings of Fact adopted by the Trial Court are actually an 
extremely accurate and complete indication of ALL evidence that 
was actually presented at trial. What Mrs. Ashton contends is 
that the Trial Court's factual findings do not support the 
Conclusions of Law or the Judgment that was based on these 
5The Trial Court would then be obligated to employ the 
procedure set forth in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 
(Utah 1988) to determine the reasonableness of the amount of 
attorney's fees sought. See Brief of Appellant, Point IV, p.20-24 
for detailed explanation of this procedure. 
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findings. The findings certainly do not rise to the level of 
clear and convincing evidence that, at the various times Decedent 
caused title to be taken in both his and Mrs. Ashton's names, 
Decedent did not intend to give Mrs. Ashton a present possessory 
interest in that property. 
Contrary to Respondent's assertions, what Mrs. Ashton is 
asking is that this Court analyze the reported facts as they 
relate to the subsequent rulings of law entered by the Trial 
Court. The facts relied upon by the Trial Court in reaching its 
legal ruling do not and cannot, as a matter of law, lead to the 
conclusion that it is "highly probable" that Decedent did not 
intend to create joint ownership properties at the time title was 
taken. Therefore, the Trial Court's ruling that Decedent's 
estate now includes all properties titled in Decedent's and Mrs. 
Ashton's name, regardless of how that title is held, is improper 
as a matter of law. 
Additionally, under Utah law, unless and until requests are 
objected to, Utah courts are obligated to grant proper requests 
for compensation from individuals who have provided services to 
an estate, as well as their requests for litigation expenses 
incurred in good faith on behalf of the estate. Because there 
were no objections to Mrs. Ashton's request that attorney 
compensation and litigation expenses be included in Decedent's 
estate, and there are no findings supporting a denial of her 
request, the Trial Court was obligated, under Utah law, to grant 
Mrs. Ashton's request. 
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Based on the foregoing arguments, Mrs. Ashton respectfully 
asks this Court to reverse the trial court and rule that 
properties titled in Decedent's and Mrs. Ashton's names as joint 
tenants with full rights of survivorship be excluded from 
Decedent's estate and that properties held as tenants in common 
be dealt with according to the provisions of the Utah Probate 
Code. Additionally, Mrs. Ashton respectfully asks this Court to 
rule that in completing the court Ordered accounting on 
Decedent's estate, Mrs. Ashton be entitled to include attorney 
compensation and litigation costs as estate expenses, which 
should be paid from the estate accordingly. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ 7 ^ day of February, 1995c 
Attorney for Appellant 
Ruth Elizabeth Ashton 
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